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MENT THAT ONLY AMERICAN MANUFACTURED

REQUIRE-

PRODUCTS BE

USED IN PUBLIC WORKS PROJECTS HELD VALID-K.S.B. Tech.
Sales Corp. v. North Jersey Dist. Water Supply Comm'n, 75 N.J.
272, 381 A.2d 774 (1977), appeal dismissed, 435 U.S. 982 (1978).

The North Jersey District Water Supply Commission (Commission) was created in 1916 for the purpose of developing and distributing the water supply sources in the northern half of the state.' In
1974, the Commission was ordered to construct a water treatment
facility to improve the quality of the water supply. 2 In compliance
with the order, the Commission prepared a set of specifications for
construction of the new facility. 3 Pursuant to state law, the specifications required that only American-manufactured products, where
4
available, be used.
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 58:5-1 to -2 (West 1966). At present, the North Jersey District Water
Supply Commission serves eight municipalities-Newark, Clifton, Paterson, Passaic, Bloomfield, Glen Ridge, Kearny and Montclair. K.S.B. Tech. Sales Corp. v. North Jersey Dist. Water
Supply Comm'n, 75 N.J. 272, 277, 381 A.2d 774, 776 (1977), appeal dismissed, 435 U.S. 982
(1978). The statutory scheme permits municipalities, who wish to develop, acquire and operate
a water supply system for the municipalities' use, to petition for a commission. N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 58:5-2 (West 1966). Once established, the Commission became a "body corporate," id. § 58:57, with the power to "acquire by purchase or condemnation" all property necessary to provide
"a sufficient water supply" for the contracting municipalities. Id. § 58:5-16. The costs of construction and acquisition of water supply facilities are to be borne by the contracting
municipalities in proportion to their water contract demands. Id. § 58:5-22. Payment of the
costs of operation of the Commission is to be made by the municipalities on a pro rata basis. Id.
§ 58:5-23. Whenever any work to be done by the Commission involves an expenditure over two
thousand dollars, the Commission is required to prepare specifications for the work to be performed and submit the specifications for public bidding, awarding the contract to "the lowest
responsible and qualified bidder." Id. § 58:5-20.
2 The New Jersey Department of Health ordered the Commission to construct the plant,
and the Commission refused. State v. North Jersey Dist. Water Supply Comm'n, 127 N.J.
Super. 251, 256, 317 A.2d 86, 89 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 65 N.J. 578, 325 A.2d 712, cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 999 (1974). The state successfully brought suit to require the Commission to
comply with the directive. 127 N.J. Super. at 259, 317 A.2d at 90.
' K.S.B. Tech. Sales Corp. v. North Jersey Dist. Water Supply Comm'n, 75 N.J. 272,
277-78, 381 A.2d 744, 776 (1977), appeal dismissed, 435 U.S. 982 (1978).
' K.S.B. Tech. Sales Corp. v. North Jersey Dist. Water Supply Comm'n, 75 N.J. 272, 278,
381 A.2d 774, 776 (1977), appeal dismissed, 435 U.S. 982 (1978). The Commission cited N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 40A:11-18 (West 1978) as authority for the Buy-American specifications. 75 N.J. at
278, 381 A.2d at 776. The Supreme Court of New Jersey noted that both the lower courts
correctly held that the applicable statutory provisions were N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:33-2 and -3
(West 1955). 75 N.J. at 278, 381 A.2d at 776. The state's Buy-American scheme encompasses all
facets of state governmental operations. State work is governed by N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:33-1
to -4 (West 1955). The Local Public Contracts Law governs work done for counties,
municipalities, and their agencies. Id. §§ 40A:11-1 to -39. Another statute governs all other
public works. Id. §§ 52:33-1 to -4. A contractor who fails to comply with these provisions may
not be awarded any public contracts for three years. Id. § 52:33-4.
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K.S.B. Technical Sales Corporation (K.S.B.), a wholly owned
subsidiary of a West German manufacturer, filed suit in the United
States District Court for the District of New Jersey, seeking to restrain the Commission from accepting bids on the grounds that the
Buy-American specification was unconstitutional. 5 The district court
abstained from ruling in order to give the New Jersey state courts the
opportunity to rule on questions of state law.6
K.S.B. and Linda Fazio, a taxpayer in a municipality serviced by
the Commission, filed suit by order to show cause seeking a declaration by the chancery division that the state's Buy-American scheme
was unconstitutional. 7 The trial court held that title 53, sections 33-2
and 33-3 of the New Jersey Statutes Annotated unconstitutionally con8
flicted with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GAII').
However, due to the speculative nature of the plaintiffs' injuries and
the injury to the public interest which would result if the project

5 K.S.B. Tech. Sales Corp. v. North Jersey Dist. Water Supply Comm'n, 150 N.J. Super.
533, 538-39, 541, 376 A.2d 203, 205-07 (Ch.Div.), modified, 151 N.J. Super. 218, 376 A.2d
960 (App. Div.), rev'd, 75 N.J. 272, 381 A.2d 744 (1977), appeal dismissed, 435 U.S. 982 (1978).
The grounds asserted to warrant the rejection of the Buy-American specifications were preemption by a "treaty" of the United States, interference with the federal foreign affairs power,
and undue burdening of foreign commerce. 150 N.J. Super. at 541, 376 A.2d at 207.
6 K.S.B. Tech. Sales Corp. v. North Jersey Dist. Water Supply Comm'n, 150 N.J. Super.
533, 540, 376 A.2d 203, 206 (Ch. Div.), modified, 151 N.J. Super. 218, 376 A.2d 960 (App.
Div.), rev'd, 75 N.J. 272, 381 A.2d 774 (1977), appeal dismissed, 435 U.S. 982 (1978). A conservator was appointed to collect and hold the bids until further order of the court. 150 N.J.
Super. at 539, 376 A.2d at 206.
7 K.S.B. Sales Corp. v. North Jersey Dist. Water Supply Comm'n, 150 N.J. Super. 533,
540, 376 A.2d 203, 206-07 (Ch. Div.), modified, 151 N.J. Super. 218, 376 A.2d 960 (App.
Div.), rev'd, 75 N.J. 272, 381 A.2d 774 (1977), appeal dismissed, 435 U.S. 982 (1978). The
Commission argued that, because K.S.B. was only a subcontractor and not entering into a direct
contractual arrangement with the Commission, the corporation lacked standing to bring suit.
150 N.J. Super. at 541-42, 376 A.2d at 207. K.S.B. argued that because it was denied the
opportunity to submit a bid, the sufficiently adverse interests of the parties were evident, establishing its standing. Id. at 592, 376 A.2d at 207. The trial court held for the corporation. Id. The
Commission also challenged Fazio's standing, on the ground that she sought to advance K.S.B.'s
pecuniary interest, and not her interest as a taxpayer. Id. at 542, 376 A.2d at 208. The trial
court disagreed, id., and the supreme court, while refusing to discuss the corporation's standing, held that Fazio clearly had standing. K.S.B. Tech. Sales Corp. v. North Jersey Dist. Water
Supply Comm'n, 75 N.J. 272, 279-80, 381 A.2d 774, 777 (1977), appeal dismissed, 435 U.S. 982
(1978); see Camden Plaza Parking, Inc. v. City of Camden, 16 N.J. 150, 158-59, 107 A.2d 1, 5
(1954).
8 K.S.B. Sales Corp. v. North Jersey Dist. Water Supply Comm'n, 150 N.J. Super. 533,
547-48, 376 A.2d 203, 210-11 (Ch.Div.), modified, 151 N.J. Super. 218, 376 A.2d 960 (App.
Div.), rev'd, 75 N.J. 272, 381 A.2d 774 (1977), appeal dismissed, 435 U.S. 982 (1978). Additionally, the trial court found that the Buy-American statute did not conflict with the commerce
clause of the United States Constitution. 150 N.J. Super. at 545-47, 376 A.2d at 209-10.
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were further delayed, the Commission was permitted to use the bids
that had already been submitted. 9
The parties cross-appealed, and the appellate division, while accepting the trial court's reasoning with regard to the unconstitutionality of the statute,' ° modified the trial court's decision by restraining
the Commission from using the bids."
In K.S.B. Technical Sales Corp. v. North Jersey Water Supply
Commission, 12 the Supreme Court of New Jersey reversed the lower
court.1 3 The court, in an opinion by Justice Schreiber, held that the
New Jersey Buy-American scheme did not conflict with the provisions
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 1 4 nor substantially interfere with the exclusive federal power to conduct foreign
affairs, 15 and was not unconstitutionally overburdening on foreign
16
commerce in violation of the commerce clause.
THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE

The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade was negotiated at
Geneva in 1947, at the same time discussion regarding the formation
7
of an International Trade Organization (ITO) was being conducted.'
9 K.S.B. Tech. Sales Corp. v. North Jersey Dist. Water Supply Comm'n, 150 N.J. Super.
533, 548-50, 376 A.2d 203, 211 (Ch. Div.), modified, 151 N.J. Super. 218, 376 A.2d 960 (App.
Div.), rev'd, 75 N.J. 272, 381 A.2d 774 (1977), appeal dismissed, 435 U.S. 982 (1978).
'0 K.S.B. Tech. Sales Corp. v. North Jersey Dist. Water Supply Comm'n, 151 N.J. Super.
218, 226-28, 376 A.2d 960, 964-65 (App. Div.), revd, 75 N.J. 272, 381 A.2d 774 (1977), appeal
dismissed, 435 U.S. 982 (1978).
"1 K.S.B. Tech. Sales Corp. v. North Jersey Dist. Water Supply Comm'n, 151 N.J. Super.
218, 228-31, 376 A.2d 960, 965-66 (App. Div.), rev'd, 75 N.J. 272, 381 A.2d 774 (1977), appeal
dismissed, 435 U.S. 982 (1978). The appellate division discussed the law of competitive bidding
in the state and found the Buy-American specification to be a condition of the bid which could
not constitutionally be waived. 151 N.J. Super. at 229, 376 A.2d at 965; see, e.g., L. Pucillo &
Sons, Inc. v. Mayor & Council, 73 N.J. 349, 356, 375 A.2d 602, 605 (1977); Terminal Constr.
Corp. v. Atlantic County Sewerage Auth., 67 N.J. 403, 412, 341 A.2d 327, 331-32 (1975);
Township of Hillside v. Sternin, 25 N.J. 317, 325-26, 136 A.2d 265, 269-70 (1957); Case v.
Trenton, 76 N.J.L 696, 700, 74 A. 672, 673-74 (Ct. Err. & App. 1909). On this ground, the
court invalidated the entire procedure followed by the Commission. 151 N.J. Super. at 229-31,
376 A.2d at 965-66.
The appellate court also amplified the trial court's holding with regard to the applicability of
GATT, and discussed the commercial aspects of the sale of water by governmental bodies. Id. at
324-25, 376 A.2d at 963.
12 75 N.J. 272, 381 A.2d 774 (1977), appeal dismissed, 435 U.S. 982 (1978).
13 75 N.J. at 303, 381 A.2d at 789.
14 Id. at 289, 381 A.2d at 782.
15 Id. at 292-93, 381 A.2d at 784.
16 Id. at 302, 381 A.2d at 789.
17 Jackson, The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in United States Domestic Law, 66
MICH. L. REV. 249, 251 (1968). GATr was intended as only a temporary measure until the
formation of the ITO. Id. at 251-52. But when Congress failed to permit American participation
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GATT is an executive agreement, applicable in the United States by
the Protocol of Provisional Application, also signed in 1947.18 The
domestic law effect of GATT in the United States is dependent upon
its status as a "treaty" 19 under the supremacy clause of the Constitution. 20 The predominant theory favoring the validity of GATT as a
"treaty" under the supremacy clause is that GAT1[ is an executive
agreement entered into by the President pursuant to authority delegated to him by Congress in the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of
1945.21

The most important case to address the validity of an executive
agreement entered into pursuant to a congressional delegation of authority was Field v. Clark.22 The Supreme Court, through Justice
Harlan, held that the Tariff Act of 1890 did not unconstitutionally
delegate legislative power and treaty making to the President.2 3 The
Field opinion outlined the long history of the investing of authority in
the Executive Branch 2 4 "in matters arising out of the execution of
statutes relating to trade and commerce with other nations." 2 5 The
in the ITO, the organization collapsed. Id. at 252. GATT thus became the general regulatory
agency for world trade. Id.
18 Id. at 253.
19 RESTATEMENT

(SECOND)

OF FOREIGN RELATIONS

LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

§§ 141-144 (1965). International treaty obligations under the Constitution may be established in
the following ways: through an agreement negotiated by the President, ratified by a two-thirds
vote in the Senate, id. § 130 & Comment a; an executive agreement of the President, acting
under authority delegated by an act of Congress, id § 131 & Comment a; or by an executive
agreement concluded by the President acting under the executive's constitutional power to conduct foreign affairs, id. § 132 & Comment a. See generally McDougal & Lans, Treaties and
Congressional-Executive or Presidential Agreements: Interchangeable Instruments of National
Policy, 54 YALE L.J. 181 (1945).
20 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
21 Act of July 5, 1945, ch. 269, 59 Stat. 410 (1945). Professor Jackson has considered closely
the arguments regarding the validity of GAT under this theory. Jackson, supra note 17, at
254-60. For a discussion of the validity of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act and its validity
as to the issue of constitutional delegation of legislative power, see Sayre, The Constitutionality
of the Trade Agreements Act, 39 COLUM. L. REv. 251 (1939).
22 143 U.S. 649 (1892).
23 Id. at 694. The Tariff Act provided that whenever the President determined that the

government of any country which exported certain duty-free goods into the United States had
imposed "reciprocally unequal and unreasonable" duties on American agricultural products, it
was within his power to suspend the duty-free status of the importing country and impose
duties upon such goods. Act of Oct. 1, 1890, ch. 1244, 26 Stat. 567, 612 (1891). The plaintiff
had imported woolen goods, which were covered by the act and upon which a duty was imposed. 143 U.S. at 662--64.
24 143 U.S. at 682-91. Justice Harlan referred to The Brig Aurora, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 382
(1813), which upheld a statute providing that when either Great Britain or France "cease[d] to
violate the neutral commerce of the United States," Act of May 1, 1810, ch. 39, 2 Stat. 605-06
(1810), the President was empowered to permit the importation of goods, otherwise prohibited.
11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 388-89.
25 143 U.S. at 691.
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decision was largely based upon the long standing practice of vesting
26
discretion in the execution of legislation in the Executive Branch.
The rationale for the decision in Field was that the President was
not making law, but merely executing the will of Congress as expressed
in the statute, when he imposed duties upon the goods of coun27
tries which in his opinion discriminated against American goods.
The Field decision affirmed the principle that Congress may vest
discretionary authority to act in foreign trade matters in the President. 28 The decision is the benchmark for all future cases where the
domestic law effect of an executive agreement entered into pursuant
29
to a delegation of congressional authority is at issue.
All the parties in K.S.B. conceded that the domestic law significance of GATT is equivalent to that of a treaty. 30 However, it is
important to examine the historical development of the doctrine
which equates executive agreements with treaties. In Missouri v. Holland, 3 1 the Supreme Court held that even in the instance where
Congress could not constitutionally act by domestic statute alone, a
treaty, and statutes enacted thereunder, still superseded inconsistent
state law. 32 This interpretation of the treaty power was expressly
applied to a dispute involving the construction of an executive agreement in United States v. Belmont.3 3 The issue in Belmont was

26

Id. at 691, 693-94.

27 Id. at 693. For a discussion of how the rationale of Field v. Clark is implicated in the

validity of GATT, see Jackson, supra note 17, at 283-84.
28 143 U.S. at 694.
29 E.g., J. w. Hampton & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928) (if act of Congress contains "intelligible principle" to which person authorized to fix rates must conform,
there is no unconstitutional delegation of legislative power); B. Altman & Co. v. United States,
224 U.S. 583, 601 (1912) ("treaty" for purposes of Circuit Court of Appeals Act includes compact
authorized by Congress, and entered into by President, without ratification). It is under this
theory that the validity of GAIT is most often asserted. Jackson, supra note 17, at 254-60.
30 75 N.J. at 280, 381 A.2d at 778; RESTATEMENT, supra note 19, §§ 141-144.
3- 252 U.S. 416 (1920). The issue before the Court in Holland was whether the Migratory
Bird Treaty Act, ch. 128, 40 Stat. 755 (1918), unconstitutionally interfered with rights reserved
to the states by the tenth amendment. 252 U.S. at 430-31.
32 252 U.S. at 433-34. Clearly, a treaty negotiated by the President and ratified by twothirds of the Senate supersedes inconsistent state law. E.g., Asakura v. City of Seattle, 262 U.S.
332 (1924); Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920); Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199
(1796).
33 301 U.S. 324 (1937). The issue in Belmont arose out of the negotiations leading to the
recognition of the Soviet Government by the United States. Id. at 330. A condition of recognition imposed upon the Soviets by the President, who was acting pursuant to his independent
powers regarding foreign affairs, was that the Soviets assign all claims they had against American
nationals to the United States government. Id. at 326, 330. The government then made demand
upon the executors of the estate of August Belmont, in whose bank a Russian corporation had
deposited funds prior to the nationalization of all such assets by the Soviets in 1918, to turn the
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whether the agreement made between the President and the Soviet
Government, which assigned all the claims of the latter against
American nationals, superseded a New York state law which would
have made the contested sums the property of the defendants. 34 Justice Sutherland, writing for a unanimous Court, adopted the principles of Missouri v. Holland, and found for the government. 35 The
Belmont Court declared that complete power over foreign affairs was
vested in the federal government and could not be interfered with by
the states, who were powerless in this sphere. 36 The Belmont decision, together with United States v. Pink, 3 7 constitutes the theoretical
basis upon which executive agreements are considered to have the
same domestic law effect as treaties ratified by the Senate. 38 These
cases settle the dispute as to the existence of any residuum of power
39
in the field of foreign affairs in the states.
Having established the grounds upon which to assert that inconsistent state law provisions must yield to GATT, it is important to
examine closely the provisions of GAIT which are involved in the
instant case. "The products of the territory of any contracting party
imported into the territory of any other contracting party," 4 0 under
Article III of GATT, "shall be accorded treatment no less favourable
than that accorded to like products of national origin in respect of all
deposits over. Id. at 325-26. When Belmont's executors refused, the government filed suit. Id.
at 326.
34 Id. at 327.
35 Id. at 331-32.
36 Id. One year earlier, Justice Sutherland wrote the opinion of the Court in another case
involving the plenary power of the national government over foreign affairs. United States v.
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936), discussed in notes 75-82 infra and accompanying text. Justice Sutherland was the foremost spokesman on the Court for an interpretation
of the Constitution giving no power over foreign affairs to the states. For an expanded exposition of Justice Sutherland's views on this subject, see C. SUTHERLAND, CONSTITUTIONAL
POWER AND WORLD AFFAIRS, 25-47, 116-26 (1919). See also Lofgren, United States v.
Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation: An HistoricalReassessment, 83 YALE L.J. 1, 11-12 (1973).
37 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
38 The Pink case involved the same executive agreement as Belmont. Id. at 211. The government brought suit against the Superintendent of Insurance for New York to require him to
turn over the New York assets of a Russian insurance company, of which over $1 million remained after policyholders' claims were paid. Id. at 210-11. The Court reaffirmed the decision
in United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937), indicating that all executive agreements have
the same effect as treaties. 315 U.S. at 226, 230.
'9 "No State can rewrite our foreign policy to conform to its own domestic policies. Power
over external affairs is not shared by the States; it is vested in the national government exclusively." United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. at 233. Additionally, the Court declared that "the
policies of the States become wholly irrelevant . . . when the United States . . . seeks enforcement of its foreign policy in the courts." Id. at 233-34; see McDougal & Lans, supra note 19, at
314-16.
40 GATT, pt. II, art. III, para. 4, 62 Stat. 3681 (1948).
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laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use." 4 1 However, this provision is inapplicable "to laws, regulations or requirements governing the procurement by governmental agencies of products purchased for governmental purposes and not with a view to
commercial resale or with a view to use in the production of goods for
commercial sale." 4 2 An examination of the foregoing provisions indicates that neither the federal nor the state governments may enact
legislation favoring domestic goods over foreign goods of signatory nations, either through tariff or import restrictions enacted by Congress,
or through excessive inspection and quality control standards on the
part of the states.4 3 This is true unless the legislation places a requirement upon a governmental agency purchasing in its capacity as a
44
governmental agency, and not acting in the commercial sphere.
In Territory of Hawaii v. Ho,45 the Supreme Court of Hawaii
struck down a state statute which had required any retailer who sold
eggs of foreign origin to display a sign so indicating. 46 The supreme
court, applying the Belmont-Pink doctrine 4 7 held that the placard statute conflicted with Article III, paragraph 4 of GATT because it singled out a product of foreign origin for discriminatory treatment.4 8
The case illustrates how GATT operates as a check upon state legislation which discriminates in favor of domestic products, even though
the burden placed upon imports may be minimal. 4 9 However, under
41 Id.
42 Id., para. 8(a).

41 Cf. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949) (economic barriers to
introduction of milk produced outside state, through inspection requirements held invalid under
commerce clause); Hale v. Bimco Trading, Inc., 306 U.S. 375 (1939) (inspection cost for im-

ported cement sixty times actual cost, where no such charge imposed on domestic cement, held
invalid under commerce clause).
GAT'T, pt. II, art. III, para. 8(a), 62 Stat. 3681 (1948).
'5 41 Haw. 565 (1957).
46 Id. at 565-66.
"

47 Id. at 568. For a discussion of the Belmont-Pink doctrine and its origins, see notes 33-39
supra.
48 41 Haw. at 570. The court examined the legislative history of the placard statute, and
found that its purpose was to protect domestic production. Id. The court also determined that
no public health or safety danger existed because the eggs were imported, and declared the
statute to be "a disguised restriction on international trade." Id. at 571. The court did not
address the issue of GATT's validity, but merely assumed it. See id. at 567.
49 See Note, National Power to Control State Discrimination Against Foreign Goods and
Persons: A Study in Federalism, 12 STAN. L. REV. 355, 357, 373-75 (1960). Some commentators

have argued that the provisions of GATr are not binding on the states, since article XXIV,
paragraph 12 of GATT provides that national governments are only required to take reasonable
steps to assure compliance with GATT's provisions. Id. at 373-74. An examination of this posi-

tion is beyond the scope of this Note. For a critical evaluation of this theory, see Jackson, supra
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the exception for governmental uses in Article III, paragraph 8(a) of
GATT, a statute which establishes a preference for domestic goods
over foreign goods is valid if the following conditions are met: (1) the
purchases themselves must be made by a governmental body; (2) for
governmental purposes; (3) not for commercial sale, or for use in the
50
production of goods for commercial sale.
This provision of GATT was construed by the California District
Court of Appeals in Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp. v. Superior
Court.5 1 The issue as to whether the purchasing agent for San Francisco could accept a bid which had not complied with a specification
requiring the use of domestic materials in the construction of a
municipal power station, 2 necessitated the court's examination of the
governmental use exception of GATT. 53 The court, in holding the
specification unconstitutional, determined that "the generation of

note 17, at 302-11. Professor Jackson's conclusion is that the supremacy clause of the Constitution renders this argument invalid, due to the mandatory effect of that provision on inconsistent
state legislation. Id. at 311.
50 GATT, pt. II, art. III, para. 3, 62 Stat. 3681 (1948).
5, 208 Cal. App. 2d 803, 25 Cal. Rptr. 798 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962). The manner in which the
case came before the court is somewhat unusual. The City of San Francisco had published a
contract proposal requesting the submission of bids for the delivery of equipment to be used in
construction of a municipal power station. Id. at 806-07, 25 Cal. Rptr. at 801. Both Baldwin and
the Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Company submitted bids for the project. Id. at 807, 25 Cal.
Rptr. at 801. Both bids were rejected and the project was readvertised, with the requirement
that all materials used in computing the new bids be of domestic manufacture as required by
statute. Id. Both companies resubmitted bids, with Baldwin submitting one bid in compliance
with the contract specification, which was higher than that of Allis, and one bid calculated to
include certain component parts manufactured outside the United States. Id. at 807-08, 25 Cal.
Rptr. at 801. Upon the advice of the city attorney that the domestic-manufacture specification
was unconstitutional, the city purchasing agent accepted the plaintiff's second bid. Id. at 808, 25
Cal. Rptr. at 802. Allis then petitioned the California superior court for a writ of mandate
commanding the purchasing agent to award the contract to Allis. Id. at 808-09, 25 Cal. Rptr. at
802. Baldwin then intervened, id. at 809, 25 Cal. Rptr. at 803, arguing that under GAIT, as
applied to the state through the supremacy clause, the specification requiring that all parts be of
domestic manufacture was unconstitutional. Id. at 810-12, 25 Cal. Rptr. at 803--04. Baldwin
therefore requested that an order, requiring the purchasing agent to award the contract to
Baldwin, be issued. Id. at 810, 25 Cal. Rptr. at 803. The superior court, while finding the
statute upon which the specification was based unconstitutional, declined to issue the relief
requested by Baldwin. Id. at 811-12, 25 Cal. Rptr. at 804. Baldwin then filed in the Supreme
Court of California for a writ of prohibition ordering the superior court to refrain from its order
that the contract be readvertised. Id. at 812, 25 Cal. Rptr. at 804. The action was then transferred to the district court of appeal. Id.
52 The court upheld the decision of the lower court, requiring that the contract be readvertised, on the ground that it was inequitable and an abuse of discretion to accept the bids of one
who had not complied with the specifications of the contract. Id. at 824, 25 Cal. Rptr. at 811.
The court also held that to allow the bids to stand would violate the requirement that all
municipal works contracts be awarded on the basis of "full and fair competitive bidding." id.
5 Id. at 819-20, 25 Cal. Rptr. at 808-09.
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electric power for resale" did not come within the exception. 54 The
Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton case is important because it is the only reported case prior to the New Jersey supreme court's decision in
K.S.B. that applied the relevant provisions of GATT to invalidate a
state statute requiring that all government projects be constructed
55
from domestic materials.
The trial court and the appellate division, in their analyses of the
governmental use exception and its applicability in K.S.B., determined that the Commission, while a governmental body, was engaged "in the production of goods for resale" and hence was not entitled to the exemption. 5 6 Indetermining that the trial court correctly
applied GATT, the appellate division examined the nature of the business of supplying water, relying on prior New Jersey decisions regarding the distribution of water by municipalities to their residents. 57 After ascertaining that water constituted "goods for sale,"

54 Id. at 819-20, 25 Cal. Rptr. at 809. It is important to note, however, that the version of
GATT used by the California district court of appeal, in determining whether the exemption
applied, differs from that applied by the New Jersey supreme court in K.S.B. Compare GATT,
pt. II, art. III, para. 5, 61 Stat. A19 (1947) with GAIT, pt. II, art. III, para. 8(a), 62 Stat. 3681
(1948). The later version, paragraph 8(a), was part of a protocol which modified Part II of GATT,
by adding the word "commercial" to the provisions regarding resale on production of goods for
sale. Both the chancery division and appellate division opinions in the K.S.B. case cite to the
earlier version. 151 N.J. Super. at 224, 376 A.2d at 962; 150 N.J. Super. at 548, 376 A.2d at
210. The significance of the modification in the governmental use exception paragraph will be
discussed at note 59 infra.
55 The Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton decision provoked much critical commentary. See, e.g.,
Comment, GATT, The California Buy American Act, and the Continuing Struggle Between
Free Trade and Protectionism, 52 CALIF. L. REV. 335 (1964); Note, State Buy-American
Policies-One Vice, Many Voices, 32 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 584 (1964) [hereinafter cited as State
Policies]; Note, California's Buy-American Policy: Conflict with GATT and the Constitution, 17
STAN. L. REV. 119 (1964). These authors supported the Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton court's decision, both on legal and public policy grounds, specifically that economic protectionism was a
thing to be avoided if at all possible and that free trade should be encouraged, for both
economic and non economic reasons. E.g., Comment, supra at 349; State Policies, supra at 606;
Note, supra, 17 STAN. L. REV. at 137.
56 151 N.J. Super. at 226, 376 A.2d at 963; 150 N.J. Super. at 548, 376 A.2d at 211. While

agreeing with the trial court that the governmental use exception did not apply in this case, the
appellate court amplified upon the trial court's analysis. 151 N.J. Super. at 224-28, 376 A.2d at
963-65.
57 151 N.J. Super. at 224-25, 376 A.2d at 963; see Reid Dev. Corp. v. Township of
Parsippany-Troy Hills, 10 N.J. 229, 233-34, 89 A.2d 667, 670 (1952) (supplying water is a
proprietary function of a municipality); Mayor of Jersey City v. Town of Harrison, 71 N.J.L. 69,
70, 58 A. 100, 101 (Sup. Ct. 1904), affd, 72 N.J.L. 185, 62 A. 265 (Ct. Err. & App. 1905)
(contract between two municipalities for sale of water is "sale of goods" within the meaning of
that term in Statute of Frauds). See also Canavan v. City of Mechanicville, 229 N.Y. 473,
476-78, 128 N.E. 882 (1920) (regardless of whether activity is for profit, furnishing of water by
"water corporation" is "sale of goods" within meaning of Uniform Sales Act, and not a governmental function).
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the court then applied the Belmont-Pink doctrine 58 to pre-empt the
challenged statute, as an unreasonable burden upon the importation
of foreign goods in violation of Part II, Article III, paragraph 4 of
GATT. 5 9
In its reversal, the supreme court unanimously rejected the
lower courts' reasoning with respect to the applicability of the governmental use exception. 60 The supreme court agreed with the
courts below that GATT's status as an executive agreement was irrelevant for the purposes of determining whether inconsistent state
statutes would be pre-empted by its provisions. 6 1 However, the
court differed sharply with the appellate division's interpretation of

These decisions are in large part based upon the once widely held theory which separated
activities of government bodies into governmental and proprietary functions. E.g.. Canavan v.
City of Mechanicville, 229 N.Y. at 476, 128 N.E. at 883. See also New York v. United States,
326 U.S. 572, 579 (1946) (governmental tax immunity not approvable when state government
pursues activity capable of being engaged in by private enterprise). The New Jersey supreme
court has since rejected this distinction between governmental and proprietary functions in a
number of contexts. B.W. King, Inc. v. Town of West New York, 49 N.J. 318, 324-26, 230
A.2d 133, 137 (1967) (governmental-proprietary distinction no longer applicable in fixing tort
liability of municipality); Township of Washington v. Village of Ridgewood, 26 N.J. 578, 584,
141 A.2d 308, 311 (1958) (governmental-proprietary distinction irrelevant to controversy regarding interpretation of zoning ordinance). See generally 18 E. MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 53.90 (3d ed. 1977).

5s See notes 33-39 supra and accompanying text.
59 151 N.J. Super. at 228, 376 A.2d at 964. The court also referred to the Baldwin-LimaHamilton decision, see notes 43-47 supra, as support for its conclusion. 151 N.J. Super. at 228,
376 A.2d at 965. Both the trial court and the appellate division applied the original version of
GATT, which was adopted in 1947. See note 54 supra. As a result, neither court had the
opportunity to examine the question as to whether the Commission's activity constituted "commercial sale." GATT, pt. II, art. III, para. 8(a), 62 Stat. 3681 (1948). However, upon close
examination of the appellate division opinion, it is reasonable to conclude that that court would
have held that the Commission's activity was indeed commercial, and would have invalidated
the specification and the statute anyway. This conclusion is based upon the court's clear reliance
on the governmental-proprietary distinction as a basis for determining that water constituted
goods for sale. See 151 N.J. Super. at 224-26, 376 A.2d at 963.
60 75 N.J. at 289, 381 A.2d at 782. Even if the supplying of water by the Commission
constituted "the production of goods for sale," in the words of the court, "it is clear ... that
these Commission operations [the collection of water and its treatment] are not for the purposes of effecting 'commercial' sales." Id. From this perspective, it becomes a matter of great
importance that the lower courts used the incorrect version of the GATT governmental use
exception. See note 54 supra. However, as stated above, see note 59 supra, it seems clear that
the appellate court would have reached the same conclusion even if the amended version of
GATT had been examined; and therefore, the supreme court's emphasis on the effect of the
word "commercial" upon the result in this case seems misplaced. Compare 75 N.J. at 285-89,
381 A.2d at 780-82 with 151 N.J. Super. at 224-26, 376 A.2d at 963.
"' See 75 N.J. at 280-81, 381 A.2d at 777-78. For a discussion of the theoretical and legal
justifications for this position, see notes 19, 33-39 supra and accompanying text.

1978]

NOTES

earlier cases regarding the status of water as "goods for commercial
62
sale," at least as it is supplied by the Commission.
Before examining the issue regarding whether water constitutes
"goods for commercial sale," the supreme court examined the statutory functions and operations of the Commission. 63 The Commission is a creature of statute and is composed of the member
municipalities. 64 Its function is to provide "a sufficient water supply"
to the member municipalities. 65 In 1962, the New Jersey legislature
supplemented the act which created the Commission with an act declaring that it is "in the public interest and ... the policy of the State
to foster and promote . . . the prompt, efficient and economical
transmission, treatment, filtration, distribution and use of the water
supplies acquired and developed by the State." 6 6 Most importantly,
in the eyes of the court, it had been recognized by the Legislature
that the Commission is performing "public and essential governmental functions." 67
68
The court then directed its inquiry to the nature of water.
However, the focus of the review was not with regard to whether
water constituted "goods," but whether the furnishing of water by the
75 N.J. at 285-89, 381 A.2d at 780-82.
Id. at 282-85, 381 A.2d at 779-80. In so doing, the supreme court framed the issues in a
different manner than the courts below. Both lower courts merely examined whether the sale of
water by the Commission constituted production of goods for sale and concluded that such
activity was outside the governmental use exception. 151 N.J. Super. at 226, 376 A.2d at 963;
150 N.J. Super. at 548, 376 A.2d at 211. The supreme court felt it necessary to examine closely
the activities and statutory powers of the Commission in order to ascertain whether the construction of a water treatment facility, for use in the treatment of water to be distributed by the
Commission to the public, constitutes a purely governmental purpose, and not a commercial
purpose. 75 N.J. at 282, 381 A.2d at 778.
64 See note 1 supra.
62
63

65 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:5-16 (West 1966).
6 Id. § 58:5-33. The act also granted additional powers to the Commission in order to

better enable it to construct and operate new facilities designed to purify the water being
supplied. Id.
61 Id. § 58:5-35. In addition, the court referred to two cases which described the Commission as a public body whose primary function is that of a "public trustee" providing essential
governmental services. North Jersey Dist. Water Supply Comm'n v. City of Newark, 103 N.J.
Super. 542, 549, 248 A.2d 249, 252 (Ch. Div.), aff'd, 52 N.J. 134, 244 A.2d 113 (1968); City of
Bayonne v. North Jersey Dist. Water Supply Comm'n, 30 N.J. Super. 409, 414, 105 A.2d 19,
22 (App. Div. 1954).
In North Jersey Dist. Water Supply Comm'n v. City of Newark, the issue before the court
was the construction of a contract among the participating municipalities. 103 N.J. Super. at
546, 248 A.2d at 251. In discussing the rate structure of the Commission, the court described
the Commission as "a public body ...

exercising public and essential government functions,"

whose purpose is "to secure and maintain adequate supplies of potable water." Id. at 549, 248
A.2d at 252 (citations omitted).
68 75 N.J. at 285-89, 381 A.2d at 780-82.
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Commission constituted commercial activity. 6 9 The court determined that although it has been recognized that rights to water may
be privately owned, 70 the fundamental character of water as a natural
resource 71 warranted the conclusion that the Commission's operations
were not commercial in nature, and therefore were exempted from
72
the application of Article III, paragraph 4 of GATI'.

69 Id. at 289, 381 A.2d at 782. As stated by the court, "it [is] unnecessary to resolve"
whether the sale of water by the Commission constitutes the sale of goods, because the purpose
of the Commission is not to effect "commercial sales." Id.
The court suggested that the Commission's activity might better be characterized "as a sale
of a 'service,' " on the grounds that as a natural resource, water is not produced, but distributed. Id. at 288, 381 a.2d at 782. As support for this theory, the court cited In re West New
York, 25 N.J. 377, 136 A.2d 654 (1957), and In re Glen Rock, 25 N.J. 241, 135 A.2d 506 (1957),
overruled on other grounds, City of N. Wildwood v. Board of Comm'rs, 71 N.J. 354, 365 A.2d
465 (1976). In In re West New York, the New Jersey supreme court was faced with the issue of
whether a municipality could impose an ad valorem property tax upon the water flowing
through the mains located in the municipality. 25 N.J. at 379-80, 136 A.2d at 655-56. While
deciding against the municipality, the court determined that water was not a product, nor considered by the water company as an asset, and that supplying water was the provision of services. Id. at 384-85, 136 A.2d at 658-59.
In In re Glen Rock, the dispute centered upon the jurisdiction of the Public Utilities Commission over the rates charged by municipally-owned water companies. 25 N.J. at 245, 135 A.2d
at 507. Holding that the Commission lacked jurisdiction, the court was required to interpret a
section of the Home Rule Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:62-24 (West 1967) which declares when
municipal activity would be considered the activity of a public utility. 25 N.J. at 246, 135 A.2d
at 508. The court determined that the words "other product" as used in the statute did not
include water. Id. at 247, 135 A.2d at 509.
70 75 N.J. at 286, 381 A.2d at 781. While recognizing the rights of a riparian owner to divert
water flowing through his land to private uses, the court noted as well that riparian rights did
not extend so far as to permit such owners to enter into the business of supplying water. Id.;
see McCarter v. Hudson County Water Co., 70 N.J. Eq. 695, 701-02, 65 A. 489, 492 (Ct. Err.
& App. 1906), aff'd, 209 U.S. 349 (1908).
The issue in McCarter was whether the commerce clause prohibited a state from preventing
a riparian owner from diverting the water flowing through his land and selling it in another
state. 70 N.J. Eq. at 700-01, 65 A. at 491-92. The Court of Errors and Appeals held that it was
unlawful for a riparian owner to sell water for non-riparian uses, basing its decision on the
power of the state to protect the public health and welfare. Id. at 719, 721, 65 A. at 499, 500.
In reaching its decision, the court declared that the state's power over these natural resources
within its boundaries was absolute, and that the protection of these resources, of which water
was one, is one of the paramount duties of government. Id. at 701, 65 A. at 492. For a discussion of the McCarter case, and the New Jersey court's subsequent treatment of this issue, see
Hanks, The Law of Water in New Jersey, 22 RUTGERS L. REV. 621, 657-63 (1968).
71 75 N.J. at 286, 381 A.2d at 780-81; see Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-bythe-Sea, 61 N.J. 296, 305, 294 A.2d 47, 52 (1972).
72 75 N.J. at 287-89, 381 A.2d at 782. In reaching this conclusion, the court rejected the
rationale relied upon by the appellate division, namely that the Commission's activity is a proprietary function of government, therefore rendering it commercial activity not exempted by
Article III, paragraph 8(a) of GAT'. Id. at 287-89, 381 A.2d at 781-82. For a discussion of the
governmental-proprietary distinction, and its rejection by the New Jersey courts, see notes
57-60 supra and accompanying text.
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THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS POWER

The second major issue which confronted the supreme court in
K.S.B. was whether the New Jersey Buy-American scheme was preempted as. an impermissible state intrusion into the realm of foreign
73
affairs, an area constitutionally reserved to the federal government.
While there is little controversy over the existence of an exclusively
federal foreign affairs power, the scope of this power has long been
74
the subject of debate.
The seminal decision on the extent of the federal foreign affairs
power is United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. 75 In that
case, the United States Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice
Sutherland, gave the most comprehensive treatment to date concerning the nature of the foreign affairs power. 76 The issue before the
Court was the validity of a congressional resolution authorizing the
President to prohibit arms sales to certain countries. 7 7 Justice
Sutherland began his inquiry by discussing the differences between
the federal government's power over foreign affairs and its powers

73 75 N.J. at 289, 381 A.2d at 782-83.
74 Henkin, The Treaty Makers and the Law Makers: The Law of the Land and Foreign

Relations, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 903, 903-05, 919-21 (1959); see Lofgren, supra note 36, at
29-32. Much of the debate in this area has centered upon Justice Holmes' statement in Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920), that the treaty power of the federal government extends
beyond Congress' power over domestic affairs, which is subject to the restraints of our system of
enumerated powers. Id. at 433. Professor Henkin's view is that the foreign affairs power extends
to any matter of international concern, and is a power limited only by congressional restraint.
For a discussion of this thesis, see Henkin, supra at 922-26. Professor Lofgren, while acknowledging that the federal foreign affairs power is indeed far-reaching, takes the position that its
exercise is limited only to subjects delegated to the federal government by the Constitution.
Lofgren, supra note 36, at 29-31.
75 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
76 Earlier cases dealing with the foreign affairs power only presumed is existence, and
merely examined its extent with regard to the specific issue involved in the case. See, e.g.,
Burnet v. Brooks, 288 U.S. 378, 396 (1933) (foreign affairs power discussed with regard to
taxation of non-resident aliens); Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299, 311-12 (1915) (foreign affairs
power discussed with respect to congressional power to regulate immigration and nationalization); Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 691-92 (1892) (foreign affairs power discussed with respect
to congressional delegation to President of power to fix tariff rates); Penhallow v. Doane, 3 U.S.
(3 Dall.) 53, 80-82 (1795) (Paterson, J.) (foreign affairs power as related to congressional authority to create court with jurisdiction to hear war prize cases).
77 299 U.S. at 314. The resolution was passed in response to an armed conflict between
Bolivia and Paraguay. Id. at 311-12. The resolution, and the subsequent prohibition of arms
sales by the President, were an attempt to have the belligerents initiate negotiations. Id. at 312.
The resolution provided criminal sanctions for violation of the ban. Id. Curtiss-Wright was indicted on a charge of conspiracy to sell arms to Bolivia, in violation of the resolution. Id. at 311.
Curtiss-Wright demurred on the ground that the joint resolution was void as an unconstitutional
delegation of congressional power to the President. Id. at 314.
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over domestic matters. 7 8 His central premise was that the states had
no residuum of power in the field of foreign affairs because the powers of external sovereignty passed to the federal government directly
from the British Crown. 79

It was Justice Sutherland's position that

the powers of external sovereignty, "as necessary concomitants of nationality," do not rely upon affirmative grants of power in the Constitution.8 o According to Justice Sutherland, the President, as the
sole representative of the nation in its dealings with foreign powers,
is vested with great authority and discretion in this realm. 8 1 As a
result, participation in the exercise of these powers on the part of
82
Congress and the states is severely limited.
Questions as to the validity of state activity in the area of foreign
affairs have arisen in a variety of contexts. In Hines v. Davidowitz,8 3 a
Pennsylvania statute requiring that aliens residing in the state register
84
annually with the department of labor and industry was challenged.
85
A similar requirement was subsequently imposed by Congress.
The issue upon which the case was decided was whether state activ-

78 Id. at 315. Justice Sutherland implied that it was obvious that fundamental differences
between these powers existed. Id.
79 Id. at 315-18. Justice Sutherland believed that the doctrine of enumerated powers only
acted as a limitation upon the federal government's power to regulate internal affairs. Id. at 316.
He took this position, because in his view, the states, in their individual capacities, never
possessed the attributes of external sovereignty. Id.; see Penhallow v. Doane, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.)
53, 80-81 (1795) (Paterson, J.). Even before the Declaration of Independence, the states acted
as a unit when dealing with problems with other nations. 299 U.S. at 316. Therefore, Justice
Sutherland asserted that the states had no power to deal with foreign affairs, and could not
delegate or limit the federal government in the exercise of these powers. Id. at 316-17.
80 299 U.S. at 318. As support for this interpretation, Justice Sutherland cited Justice Story's
treatise on the Constitution. Id. at 317 n.i. Justice Story's discussion of the Constitution and
the events leading up to its enactment, focused on the colonial period and the history of the
nation under the Articles of Confederation. During this period, the states always acted in concert when dealing with foreign powers. From this practice, Justice Story, and Justice Sutherland, concluded that the powers of external sovereignty had vested in the national government
from the time of the signing of the Declaration of Independence. See 1 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 210-216 (3d ed. 1858). For a less
expansive interpretation of the legal effect of this early history, see Lofgren, supra note 36, at

13-17.
81 299 U.S. at 319-20. Justice Sutherland examined early commentary on the nature of the
President's authority, and concluded this was indeed the intention of the framers. Id. at 319-21.
82 Id. This conclusion was recognized by the New Jersey supreme court in the K.S.B. case.
75 N.J. at 290, 381 A.2d at 783.
83 312 U.S. 52 (1941).

84 Id. at 59. The challenged statute also provided for fines and/or imprisonment for those
aliens who failed to register. Id. at 59-60.
85 Id. Congress had passed the Alien Registration Act in 1946, ch. 439, 54 Stat. 670 (1946),
the registration and identification provisions of which were more lenient than those contained in
the state statute. 312 U.S. at 60-61.
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ity concurrent with the federal government was constitutionally permissible. 8 6 After the examination of the federal power to regulate
naturalization and immigration, the Court determined that state activity in this sphere was pre-empted by the Constitution, as an area
where uniformity was desirable if not necessary, and invalidated the
87
state statute.
In a similar case, De Canas v. Bica, 8 8 the Court held that a
California statute prohibiting an employer from knowingly hiring an
illegal alien was not unconstitutional as a regulation of immigration,
nor pre-empted by the Federal Immigration and Nationality Act. 89
The Court declared that Hines was completely consistent with this
result because Congress had not manifested an intent to prohibit state
regulation in the field of employment. 90
In Clark v. Allen, 9 1 it was asserted that the foreign affairs power
invalidated a California statute which prohibited non-resident aliens
from inheriting real or personal property of a California decedent un92
less a reciprocal right for American citizens existed in that country.
In an opinion by Justice Douglas, the Court upheld the statute as it
applied to personal property. 9 3 Justice Douglas reasoned that the
California statute would have only an "incidental or indirect effect in
foreign countries," and unless clear federal policy indicated to the
contrary, the question of succession to property was one of local concern.94
The foreign affairs power was used in Zschernig v. Miller 95 to
invalidate an Oregon statute which conditioned the rights of non86 312 U.S. at 67-68.
87 Id.

at 73-74. The decision rested upon the premise that congressional intent was manifest

in its desire to afford a uniform system of naturalization and immigration, and that to allow the
states to regulate in this sphere was fraught with the danger of offending another country. Id. at
62-64, 74.
88 424 U.S. 351 (1976).
89 Id. at 365. The California court of appeal, in declaring the statute unconstitutional, relied
upon Hines. De Canas v. Bica, 40 Cal. App. 3d 976, 978-79, 115 Cal. Rptr. 444, 445 (Ct. App.
1974), revd, 424 U.S. 351 (1976).
90 424 U.S. at 362. The Court relied in large part upon congressional enactments in the area
which specifically stated that the federal acts "[were] intended to supplement State action." Id.
at 362 (emphasis in original); see, e.g., Farm Labor Contractor Registration Act, 7 U.S.C. §§
2041, 2051 (1976).
91 331 U.S. 503 (1947).
92 Id. at 506, 516. The issue with respect to the validity of a devise of real property to the
plaintiffs was resolved by reference to a treaty concluded between Germany and the United
States, which provided for reciprocal rights to inherit real property. Id. at 507-14.
93 Id. at 516-17. The Court had previously determined that the treaty provisions, discussed
in note 92 supra, did not apply with respect to personalty. 331 U.S. at 514-16.
94 331 U.S. at 517.
95 389 U.S. 429, rehearing denied, 390 U.S. 974 (1968).
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resident aliens to inherit from Oregon residents upon the heir's demonstration that reciprocal rights existed on behalf of the United
States citizen, and that the foreign country would not confiscate personalty passing to the non-resident heir. 9 6 Justice Douglas, again
writing for the Court, found that the statute and others like it were
being used to validate extensive investigation into the nature of the
government of the foreign nation, in order to determine if property
would be confiscated. 97 The Court re-examined Clark and held that
it was still valid insofar as an investigation under a statute of its type
required only "a routine reading of foreign laws," for a determination
to be made. 9 8
Analysis of the foregoing cases serves to indicate what should be
the relevant considerations in a determination of the validity of state
activity challenged under the foreign affairs power. Hines makes it
clear that state activity in an area expressly reserved to the federal
government, or one in which uniformity is desirable and congressional intent is manifest, will be struck down under the supremacy
clause. 9 9 Similarly, legislation in spheres traditionally reserved to
the states, where federal supremacy interests are not asserted, will be
validated as incidental activity permissible under the Constitution. 10 0
But when state activity becomes deeply involved in an evaluation of
questions of political ideology or interpretation of foreign law questions, that activity will be inimical to national interests and struck
down. l0'
In Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Board of Commissioners of the Department of Water and Power,' 0 2 California's Buy-American statutes
were struck down as having " 'a direct impact upon foreign relations,' " interfering with the federal government's power to regulate
foreign trade. 10 3 The court examined the federal government's policy
96 389 U.S. at 440-41. The Oregon statute provided that property which was noninheritable under the statute would escheat to the state. Id. at 430 n.1.
97 Id. at 433-34. Justice Douglas declared that inheritance rights were being conditioned
upon the " 'democracy quotient' " of the particular nation, id.at 435, and were subject to the
foreign policy attitudes of individual judges. Id. at 434-37.
98 Id. at 432-33. Justice Douglas also indicated that Clark was merely an examination of the
California statute on its face, and that it required that a statute of its kind cannot have more
than an "incidental" effect abroad. Id. at 432-33. This distinction served to prevent Clark from
being overruled by Zschernig. See In re Estate of Kish, 52 N.J. 454, 466, 246 A.2d 1,8 (1968).
99 See notes 83-87 supra and accompanying text.
100 See notes 88-94 supra and accompanying text.
101 See notes 94-98 supra and accompanying text.
102 276 Cal. App. 2d 221, 80 Cal. Rptr. 800 (Ct. App. 1969).
103Id. at 229, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 805 (citations omitted). The California Buy-American scheme,
CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 4300-4305 (West 1966), required all public works contracts to contain
specifications mandating that only domestic materials be used, and provided that failure to com-
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with regard to foreign trade, as it was expressed in various treaties
and executive agreements, including GATIT. 0 4 The court declared
this area to be of national concern and beyond the competence of
state legislatures. 10 5 The court then applied Zschernig and found
that the potentiality for embarrassment of the national government as
a result of California's protectionist policy was very great, and that
the scheme had more than an " 'incidental or indirect effect' " upon
06
foreign trade. 1
The issue as to whether the foreign affairs power precluded New
Jersey from enforcing its Buy-American scheme was raised for the
first time in the K.S.B. case in the supreme court. 10 7 The court
recognized that states are severely limited in their exercise of legislative power regulating matters related to foreign affairs. '0 8 In addressing the question as to whether the New Jersey Buy-American
scheme unduly interfered with the federal domain, the court determined that the principle established by Zschernig and Clark was that
if a state statute, on its face, has only an incidental impact upon
foreign affairs and does not require a detailed examination of the
policies of another nation, it is valid. 1 9
Justice Schreiber then examined the challenged statutes in light
of Zschernig and Clark, and determined that the legislature clearly
did not intend the detailed assessment of the political and economic
0 Jusclimate of foreign nations which was condemned in Zschernig.11
ply would result in a suspension from the awarding of such contracts for a period of three years.

Id. § 4304.
104 276 Cal. App. 2d at 226, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 803.
105 Id. at 226-27, 80 Cal. Rptr. 803. The court discussed Curtiss-Wright, Belmont, and Pink,

and determined that these cases indicated a clear constitutional mandate that state governments
refrain from activity in the sphere of foreign relations. Id. at 225-26, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 802-03.
For a discussion of the Belmont-Pink doctrine, see notes 33-39 supra and accompanying text.
Curtiss-Wright is discussed in notes 75-82 supra and accompanying text.
106 276 Cal. App. 2d at 228-29, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 805. The court discussed the possibility of
retaliatory action by affected nations, as well as the necessity for uniformity of treatment of
foreign goods. Id. For a critical evaluation of Bethlehem Steel, see Note, 3 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L.
POL. 164 (1970).
107 75 N.J. at 289, 381 A.2d at 782-83.
108 Id. at 290, 381 A.2d at 783.
109 Id. at 290-91, 381 A.2d at 783-84. In his discussion of these cases, Justice Schreiber
pointed out that while Zschernig had invalidated the Oregon probate statute because it encouraged a detailed examination of the policies of foreign states, the factthat Clark was not overruled clearly indicates that state regulation which only incidentally affects foreign affairs is permissible, and that such determinations may be made upon a facial examination of the challenged
enactment. Id. at 290-91, 381 A.2d at 783; see notes 95-106 supra and accompanying text.
"o
75 N.J. at 291, 381 A.2d at 783. Justice Schreiber based this conclusion on the fact that
the challenged statutes apply uniformly to all foreign goods, prohibiting their use, unless the
cost of comparable domestic materials is "unreasonable" or "inconsistent with the public interest." Id. at 291, 293, 381 A.2d at 783, 784; N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:33-2, 3 (West 1966).
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tice Schreiber then focused upon the Bethlehem Steel decision. The
California decision was distinguished upon the ground that the BuyAmerican scheme struck down in Bethlehem Steel was much more
restrictive than New Jersey's plan.'1 1 Additionally, the Bethlehem
Steel court failed to examine the governmental use exemption of
2
GATT in declaring the California scheme unconstitutional."1
THE COMMERCE CLAUSE

It is well settled that congressional power to regulate foreign
commerce is coextensive with the power to regulate interstate commerce." 3 Equally important is the principle that despite the language of the Constitution authorizing Congress to regulate foreign
and interstate commerce, 114 states may enact legislation in areas affecting commerce, in the absence of congressional action or inaction
pre-empting the field. 115 The fundamental purpose of the commerce
clause is to prevent the states from establishing barriers to the free
116
flow of goods from other states and nations.
Traditionally, the commerce clause has been invoked to invalidate state regulation in the private sector designed to give domestic
producers an economic advantage over producers from other states or
nations through the erection of trade barriers of the granting of concessions not available to out-of-state producers. 1 7 However, the
Perhaps more importantly, in light of the Hines and De Canas decisions, discussed supra
notes 83-90, the New Jersey Buy-American provisions are fundamentally the same as the Federal Buy-American Act, 41 U.S.C. §§ 10a-10d (1976). Compare N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:33-2 to -3
(West 1966) with 41 U.S.C. §§ 10a-10b (1976). Except for GAIT, no federal enactment requires
that the states not discriminate in favor of domestic products, in an area generally reserved to
the states themselves, as in De Canas.
1" 75 N.J. at 292-93, 381 A.2d at 784. Compare CAL. GOVT CODE §§ 4300-4305 (West
1966) with N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:33-2 to-3 (West 1966).
112 75 N.J. at 293, 381 A.2d at 784. For a discussion of the governmental use exception of
GATT, see notes 41-44, 56-72 supra and accompanying text. Justice Schreiber concluded that
the inclusion of the governmental use exception in GATT indicated federal acceptance of restrictive state purchasing policies. See 75 N.J. at 293, 381 A.2d at 784.
13 Pittsburgh & S. Coal Co. v. Bates, 156 U.S. 577, 587 (1895); The License Cases, 46 U.S.
(5 How.) 504, 578 (1847).
114 U. S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
"5 Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 143 (1970); Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53
U.S. (12 How.) 299, 318-19 (1852).
116 Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 370 (1976); Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 446-47 (1827).
117 E.g., Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970) (Arizona statute requiring all melons grown in state be packaged in approved containers before shipping to other states held
invalid); Polar Ice Cream & Creamery Co. v. Andrews, 375 U.S. 361 (1964) (Florida statute
favoring local milk producers, not involving state purchases, held invalid under commerce
clause); Hale v. Bimco Trading, Inc., 306 U.S. 375 (1939) (imposition of inspection requirement

1978]

NOTES

treatment of state legislation which places conditions upon those who
wish to deal with the state or its subdivisions has been very different. 118
In Garden State Dairies of Vineland, Inc. v. Sills, 1 19 the New
Jersey supreme court was faced with the issue of whether a state
could constitutionally favor local milk producers when making purchases for its own use. 120 In remanding the case, the court held that
while the state scheme requiring certification of domestic purchases
was not per se unconstitutional, there was a possibility that it im12 1
posed an "undue burden" on interstate commerce.
The rationale of the Garden State Dairies decision was explicitly
rejected by the United States District Court for the Northern District
and fee on imported cement, where similar requirement not imposed on domestic cement, held
transparent discrimination against foreign commerce); Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S.
511 (1934) (refusal to issue license to sell milk unless producer complied with minimum price
required to be paid to domestic producers declared invalid as equivalent to imposition of customs duties on imports); see Melder, The Economics of Trade Barriers, 16 IND. L.J. 127,
133-39 (1940).
118 It is well established that absent strong countervailing considerations, states are free,
under the fourteenth amendment, to establish the terms and conditions upon which those who
wish to deal with them are to be governed. E.g., Heim v. McCall, 239 U.S. 175 (1915) (state
statute requiring that only United States citizens be employed to work on public works projects
held not violative of equal protection); Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U.S. 207 (1903) (state statute requiring all government contractors to abide by state maximum hours law held not to violate equal
protection). But see Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973) (state statute prohibiting
employment of resident aliens in civil service positions held unconstitutional). The general principle underlying these cases may be found in Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113 (1940),
where it was stated "'[Iike private individuals and businesses, the Government enjoys the unrestricted power to produce its own supplies, to determine those with whom it will deal, and to
fix the terms and conditions upon which it will make needed purchases." Id. at 127.
19 46 N.J. 349, 217 A.2d 126 (1966).
120 Id. at 353, 217 A.2d at 127-28. The New Jersey legislature had enacted a provision which
required that all state agencies who purchased milk for use in state institutions obtain a certification from the seller that he would purchase an amount of milk produced in New Jersey equal
to that supplied to the agency. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:25-23,:27B-61 (West 1955). Garden State
Dairies filed a complaint alleging that, although it operated a dairy in New Jersey, it was unable
to satisfy the certification requirement and therefore was unable to bid on a contract to supply
milk to New Jersey State Hospital. 46 N.J. at 352, 217 A.2d at 127. The plaintiff sought a
declaration that the statute was an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce. Id. at 353,
217 A.2d at 127.
121 46 N.J. at 358, 217 A.2d at 130. The court, in reaching this conclusion, examined Atkin
and Heim, 46 N.J. at 354, 217 A.2d at 128; see note 118 supra. The court questioned whether
the rationale of those cases applied as broadly as it once had, but the tenor of those decisions
led to the conclusion that it would be inappropriate to declare the certiication scheme invalid
without an examination of its economic effects. 46 N.J. at 354-55, 358, 217 A.2d at 128-30. The
case was remanded because the plaintiffs attack was on the face of the statute. Id. at 358-59,
217 A.2d at 130-31. In so holding, the court distinguished Polar Ice Cream & Creamery Co. v.
Andrews, 375 U.S. 361 (1964), where the Supreme Court declared a Florida statute favoring
local milk producers unconstitutional, without first examining the burdens placed on interstate
commerce, on the ground that the case did not involve purchase by the state itself. 46 N.J. at
357, 217 A.2d at 130.
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of Florida in American Yearbook Co. v. Askew. 122 The three-judge
panel upheld a Florida statute requiring that all public printing was
to be performed by Florida printers. 123 In resolving the commerce
clause issue, the court held that while state regulation of trade in the
private sector is subject to commerce clause restrictions, these restraints are inapplicable to statutes imposing conditions on state
purchases. 124
The first case in which the Supreme Court discussed the constitutional implications of state entry into the market as a purchaser of
goods was Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp. 125 The Court was
faced with the question of whether the imposition of additional requirements upon an out-of-state corporation seeking to avail itself of a
state subsidy program unduly burdened interstate commerce. 12 6 In

339 F. Supp. 719, 725 (N.D. Fla.), summarily affd, 409 U.S. 904 (1972).
339 F. Supp. at 725. American Yearbook was a printer of school yearbooks, and did not
have a printing facility in Florida. Id. at 720. The Florida statute was attacked on the grounds
that it constituted an unconstitutional delegation of power to the state department of general
services, that the statute denied American Yearbook equal protection in violation of the fourteenth amendment, and that the statute placed an undue burden on interstate commerce. Id.
The delegation question and the equal protection issue were decided in favor of the state. id. at
721, 723.
124 Id. at 725. The district court distinguished Polar Ice Cream on the same grounds as the
New Jersey supreme court did in Garden State Dairies. Id. at 724-25. The New Jersey decision
was rejected because "[t]o subject every job specification to an ad hoc measurement of its effect
on interstate commerce would unduly interfere with state proprietary functions if not bring
them to a standstill." Id. at 725.
American Yearbook was summarily affirmed by the Supreme Court, 409 U.S. 904 (1972).
Summary affirmances have precedential value only with regard to "the precise issues presented
and necessarily decided by those actions." Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173, 176 (1977). The
K.S.B. court accepted American Yearbook as precedent "for the proposition that facially restrictive state purchasing statutes are permissible under the Commerce Clause where the state is
purchasing . . . for its own end use." 75 N.J. at 297, 381 A.2d at 787.
122

123

125 426 U.S. 794 (1976).
126

Id. at 801-02. The state of Maryland, in seeking to alleviate problems resulting from the

abandonment of automobiles on the state's highways, instituted a program by which scrap processors licensed by the state would receive bounties for the destruction of any vehicle titled in
Maryland. Id. at 796-97. A licensed processor would be required to share his bounty equally
with any wrecker licensed by the state who delivered a vehicle to him. Id. However, it was not
necessary to have a processing plant in Maryland in order to become licensed. Id. at 799. In
order to avoid suits for conversion of vehicles claimed not to have been abandoned, a processor
was required to obtain certain specified documents by which title could be established. Id. at
798. However, title did not necessarily have to be established for certain vehicles classified as
"hulks" under the statute as originally enacted. Id. at 798-99.
In 1974, the subsidy program was amended to require that title be established for "hulks" in
the same manner as that for other abandoned vehicles. Id. at 800. However, the documentation
required of a Maryland processor was less severe than that required of an out-of-state processor.
Id. at 800-01. Alexandria Scrap Corporation, a Virginia processor brought suit alleging that the
1974 amendment denied it equal protection of the laws under the fourteenth amendment, and
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upholding the state scheme, Justice Powell, writing for the Court,
held that the commerce clause was not intended to regulate commerce created when the state itself entered the market as a purchaser.1 2 7 The decision was largely based upon the premise that traffic in the subsidized article would not have existed but for the state
program.' 2 S Additionally, no effort was made by the state to prevent
the flow of such articles in interstate commerce, thereby rendering
traditional "undue burden" analysis inapplicable.' 29 Because Congress had not acted in this particular area of commerce, it was
deemed perfectly permissible for states to prefer their own residents
30
in programs of this type.'
In passing upon the merits of the commerce clause issue, the
K.S.B. court found the Alexandria Scrap decision to be controlling. 13 1 Justice Schreiber interpreted Alexandria Scrap and American Yearbook to stand for the proposition that state legislation with
respect to purchases for its own end use, absent federal action, is not
subject to traditional commerce clause restrictions.13 2 Consequently,
the court held that the legislature's Buy-American scheme was not an
unconstitutional burden on foreign commerce. 13 In reaching this

that the amendment placed an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce. Id. at 802. A
three-judge district court granted summary judgment to Alexandria Scrap on both claims, and
enjoined the state from further enforcing the amendments. Alexandria Scrap Corp. v. Hughes,
391 F. Supp. 46 (D. Md. 1975), rev'd, 426 U.S. 794 (1976).
127 426 U.S. at 805-06, 809.
128 Id. at 809 n.18. However, as Justice Powell indicated, no evidence was adduced by the
parties as to the relevant market statistics with regard to the hulk market before the subsidy
program was instituted, thereby making it impossible for the Court to rest its decision solely on
that basis. Id.
129 Id. at 806, 808 n.17. Justice Powell declared that the unusual part of the case was not that
the issue was before the Court for the first time, but rather that the scheme had been characterized as a burden on interstate commerce at all. Id. at 807.
13' Id. at 810 & n.19. In a footnote, Justice Powell indicated that the Court in Alexandria
Scrap was not taking a position on whether Congress could constitutionally prohibit states from
"selective participation" in the hulk market. Id. at 810 n. 19; see National League of Cities v.
Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (tenth amendment is bar to congressional extension of Fair Labor
Standards Act to include all state employees).
The court's decision in Alexandria Scrap is discussed in Note, 31 U. MIAMI L. REv. 729
(1977). See also The Supreme Court 1975 Term, 90 HARV. L. REV. 5, 58-63 (1976).
131 75 N.J. at 300, 381 A.2d at 788. While Alexandria Scrap dealt only with commerce
among the states, Justice Schreiber did not consider that fact a sufficient justification for distinguishing the case. Id. at 299, 381 A.2d at 788.
132 Id. at 298, 381 A.2d at 787.
133 Id. at 300-01, 381 A.2d at 788-89. In reaching this result, Justice Schreiber examined
the argument that American Yearbook and Alexandria Scrap only permitted states to favor their
own residents, without regard to national interests, in the Buy-American context. Id. at 298,
381 A.2d at 787. Such a reading would require that promoting the national economy be considered not of legitimate local concern. Id. Justice Schreiber, in dismissing this proffered in-
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conclusion, the court was forced to review its holding in Garden State
Dairies.134 Justice Schreiber considered the result in Garden State
Dairies to be the product of precedent then prevailing and declared
the court's approach in that case "no longer viable in light of
Alexandria Scrap." 135
In evaluating the impact of the New Jersey supreme court's decision upholding the state's Buy-American scheme in government procurement, it is important to understand the pervasiveness of this policy in our federal system. A 1963 survey conducted by the National
Association of State Purchasing Officials indicated that well over onethird of the states employed restrictive purchasing policies, either by
statutory requirement or unofficial policy. 136 Because New Jersey's
Buy-American scheme does not mandate purchase preferences for
New Jersey products, it is by and large one of the less restrictive
schemes presently in effect.' 3 7 It has been estimated that the repeal
of the Federal Buy-American Act138 would result in a saving of at
least one hundred million dollars annually, while increasing customs
revenues by a similar amount.139

Buy-American legislation has been attacked successfully upon a
number of grounds, including pre-emption under GATT, 140 under

terpretation of these cases, called such a position incongruous with the general principles which
underlie the commerce clause and rejected it out of hand. Id.
134 Id. at 299, 381 A.2d at 787; see notes 119-24 supra and accompanying text.
135 75 N.J. at 299, 381 A.2d at 787. As additional justification for the court's decision that the
New Jersey Buy-American scheme did not run afoul of the commerce clause, Justice Schreiber
referred to the court's earlier holding that the Commission's activity was a proper governmental
purpose, unrelated to activity in the private sector. Id. at 300, 381 A.2d at 788; see notes 63-72
supra and accompanying text. This, coupled with the fact that Congress has approved the policy
of preference for domestic material in federal public works projects, see note 110 supra and
accompanying text, was a clear indication that New Jersey's Buy-American scheme, modeled
after the federal scheme, was consistent with national policy. 75 N.J. at 301-02, 381 A.2d at
788-89.
136 State Policies, supra note 55, at 585 (citing National Association of State Purchasing Officials Committee on Competition in Governmental Purchasing, 1963 Survey on In-State Preference Practices, Domestic v. Foreign Purchasers(unpublished compilation by NASPO, 1313 East
60th St., Chicago, Illinois 60637)).
137 Compare N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 52:33-2, -3 (West 1955) with ALA. CODE tit. 41, § 16-57
(1975); HAW. REV. STAT. § 103-42 to 46 (1976 & 1978 Supp.); IOWA CODE ANN. § 73.1-11
(West 1973 & 1978-1979 Cum. Supp.); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 7, § 22 (West 1973); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 51 (West Cum. Supp. 1978-1979); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 639 (Purdon
1962 & 1978-1979 Cum. Supp.).
138 41 U.S.C. §§ 10a-10d (1976).
"9 See State Policies, supra note 55, at 598.
140 Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp. v. Superior Court, 208 Cal. App. 2d 803, 25 Cal. Rptr.
798 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962); Territory of Hawaii v.. Ho, 41 Haw. 565 (1957); see notes 47-55 supra
and accompanying text.
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the foreign affairs power, 1 4 1 under the commerce clause, l4 2 and as a
violation of statutes mandating competitive bidding.14 3 The supreme
court's decision in K.S.B. is the first reported case to uphold a BuyAmerican scheme against attack on any of these grounds.
The Supreme Court's decisions in Alexandria Scrap and National
League of'Cities v. Usery 144 are strong indications that states will be
permitted to experiment with their local economies free from federal
interference. This consideration buttresses the New Jersey supreme
court's decision to interpret the GATT governmental uses exemption
1 45
broadly, and is crucial to an understanding of the K.S.B. decision.
Similar justifications exist for the narrow view taken by the court with
46
respect to the foreign affairs power issue. 1
The significance of K.S.B. should not be underestimated. It is a
clear indication that state courts once constrained to reject state programs that arguably conflicted with overall federal goals now feel free
to uphold them when it is in the best interests of the state.' 4 7 The
"new federalism" as it has developed under the Burger Court has
clearly begun to take hold in the form of state economic programs
designed to combat local problems. 148 Through this decision, the

'41

Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Board of Comm'rs of the Dept. of Water & Power, 276 Cal.
App. 2d 221, 80 Cal. Rptr. 800 (Ct. App. 1969); see notes 102-07 supra and accompanying text.
142 City of Columbus v. Miqdadi, 195 N.E. 2d 923, 925, 928 (Columbus Mun. Ct. 1963);
City of Columbus v. McGuire, 195 N.E.2d 916, 923 (Columbus Mun. Ct. 1963); State v. Jacobson, 80 Ore. 648, 658, 157 P. 1107, 1112 (1916).
143 American Inst. for Imported Steel, Inc. v. County of Erie, 32 App. Div. 2d 231, 233, 302
N.Y.S.2d 61, 64 (1969); Texas Highway Comm'n v. Texas Ass'n of Steel Importers, Inc., 372
S.W.2d 525, 527, 529-30 (Sup. Ct. Tex. 1963).
14 426 U.S. 833 (1976); see note 130 supra.
145 See notes 63-72 supra and accompanying text. While the North Jersey District Water
Supply Commission is a governmental agency, the sale of water might just have easily been
considered a commercial function. See notes 51-52 supra. See also State Policies, supra note 55,
at 593.
146 See notes 109-110 supra and accompanying text. While Justice Schreiber's assertion that
New Jersey's Buy-American scheme had only an indirect effect on foreign affairs may be correct
in an individual state's case, the aggregate economic effect of state Buy-American policies may
be somewhat more substantial. See generally Melder, supra note 117, at 127-30.
147 Compare K.S.B. Tech. Sales Corp. v. North Jersey Dist. Water Supply Comm'n, 75 N.J.
272, 381 A.2d 774 (1977) with Garden State Dairies of Vineland, Inc. v. Sills, 46 N.J. 349, 217
A.2d 126 (1966). See Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963) (doctrine that due process authorizes courts to declare economic legislation unconstitutional when they believe legislature has
acted unwisely, discarded in favor of proposition that courts should not substitute their
economic beliefs for judgment of legislature).
14' See generally Catz & Lenard, The Demise of the Implied Federal Preemption Doctrine, 4
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 295 (1977); Michelman, States' Rights and States' Roles: Permutations
of "Sovereignty" in National League of Cities v. Usery, 86 YALE L.J. 1165 (1977); Tribe, Unraveling National League of Cities: The New Federalism and Affirmative Rights to Essential
Government Services, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1065 (1977).
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New Jersey supreme court has indicated that, absent a strong constitutional policy to the contrary, it will leave the legislature relatively
free to construct solutions for local economic problems.
Robert K. Walsh

